We study all-pay auctions with discrete strategy sets and analyze the equilibrium strategies when players have asymmetric values of winning as well as asymmetric e¤ort constraints. We show that for any number of players if one of them has the highest e¤ort constraint then, independent of the players' values of winning, he is the only player with a positive expected payo¤. In a case that two players have the same highest e¤ort constraint then they do not necessarily have the highest expected payo¤s. Our results show a signi…cant distinction of the equilibrium strategies between two players and a larger number of players, particularly when the player with the highest e¤ort constraint is not unique.
Introduction
The all-pay auction is one of the main contest forms in the literature on contest theory.
Numerous applications have been made to rent-seeking and lobbying in organizations, R&D races, political contests, promotions in labor markets, trade wars and military and biological wars of attrition. In all-pay auctions, all players, including those who do not win the prize, incur costs as a result of their e¤orts, but only the player with the highest e¤ort receives the prize. Hillman and Samet (1987) , Hillman and Riley (1989) and Bay et al. (1996) characterized the equilibrium strategies of the all-pay auction under complete information. Che and Gale (1996) showed that the all-pay auction dominates the …rst-price auction with respect to the players'total e¤ort when the players are e¤ort constrained and these constraints are private information to the players. When the players have the same e¤ort constraint which is commonly known, Che and Gale (1998) calculated the bidding equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two players having di¤erent values for a prize and linear cost functions, and demonstrated that if the e¤ort constraint is smaller than or equal to half of the players' smaller winning value, the expected total e¤ort might be higher than in the same contest where the players do not have any e¤ort constraint. 1 On the other hand, if the players have the same e¤ort constraint and that it is larger than half of the players' smaller winning value, the players'expected payo¤s as well as their expected total e¤ort are the same as in the standard all-pay auction without any e¤ort constraint. 2 Later, Hart (2016) showed that the all-pay auction is an application of the Captain Lotto game which is a Lotto game with caps. Using this equivalence he characterized the equilibrium strategies in the two-player all-pay auction with di¤erent e¤ort constraints. The analysis of the all-pay auction with more than two e¤ort-constrained players has not as yet been done, and therefore the aim of this paper is to shed light on this contest when there are more than two players with asymmetric e¤ort constraints, and particularly to show that the behavior of these players might be completely di¤erent than in the all-pay auction with only two players. Furthermore, our results will show that the behavior of the players in all-pay auctions with multiple players and asymmetric e¤ort constraints breaks some well-known conventions about the model of the all-pay auction with and without e¤ort constraints.
We consider all-pay auctions with discrete strategy sets, namely, the players have e¤ort constraints and …nite strategy sets. The main di¤erence between our model with discrete strategies and the standard all-pay auction with continuous strategies is that in the standard model the probability of a tie (the players exert the same e¤ort) is zero, while in our model there is a positive probability for a tie. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994) and Cohen and Sela (2007) studied the symmetric and asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with discrete strategies but without e¤ort constraints, and showed that the equilibrium strategies are similar to those of the standard all-pay auction with continuous strategies. However, Dechenaux et al. (2012) showed that when there is a symmetric budget constraint, the all-pay auction with discrete strategies and the standard all-pay auction with continuous strategies are not necessarily similar. Given that we do not know much about the standard multiple-player all-pay auction with asymmetric e¤ort constraints, we can only conjecture that the distinction between the standard all-pay auction and the all-pay auction with discrete strategies is even stronger when there are more than two players with asymmetric e¤ort constraints.
We …rst analyze the equilibrium strategies in the two-player all-pay auction. Since the equilibrium in this model with asymmetric e¤ort constraints is not unique even when the smallest money unit converges to zero, the equilibrium in our model and the standard allpay auction is not necessarily similar. However, independent of the size of the smallest money unit, we characterize common properties that provide a uniform framework to all the equilibrium points. We show that the probability of every pure strategy to be chosen in equilibrium, except the lowest (zero) and the highest (minimal level of the players'budget constraints) possible e¤orts, converges to zero when the smallest money unit also converges to zero. Furthermore, the maximal distance between two adjacent strategies that are chosen by a player with a positive probability is twice than the smallest money unit. Although the equilibrium is generally not unique, we show that when the smallest money unit converges to zero in any equilibrium point, independent of the players'values of winning, the expected payo¤ of the player with the lower e¤ort constraint converges to zero, while the expected payo¤ of the player with the higher e¤ort constraint converges to the di¤erence of this player's value of winning and his opponent's e¤ort constraint. Last, we demonstrate that by imposing an e¤ort cap on the player with the higher value of winning, a contest designer can attaint an expected total e¤ort that is larger than in the all-pay auction with either discrete or continuous strategies when both players do not face any constraint.
In contrast to the two-player all-pay auction, when there are more than two players with asymmetric e¤ort constraints, all the players may be active when each of them has a completely di¤erent strategy as well as a di¤erent expected payo¤ and a di¤erent probability to win the contest. However, for each all-pay auction with multiple asymmetric e¤ort-constrained players, by mathematical methods, we are able to numerically calculate systems of non-linear equations and derive the equilibrium strategies . Using these equilibrium calculations we …nd that several well-known facts about the two-player all-pay auction with and without e¤ort constraints no longer hold. For instance, when there are more than two players the probability of every pure strategy to be chosen in equilibrium does not necessarily converge to zero when the smallest money unit converges to zero, and the maximal distance between two adjacent strategies that are chosen by a player with a positive probability might be signi…cantly higher than twice the size of the money unit. We also show that in all-pay auctions with more than two e¤ort-constrained players, a player may have a completely di¤erent expected payo¤ for di¤erent equilibrium strategies. Moreover, given an all-pay auction, in one equilibrium player i is the only player with a positive expected payo¤, and in another player j is the only player with a positive expected payo¤.
In the all-pay auction with multiple asymmetric e¤ort-constrained players it is not clear 
where m(x) denotes the number of players who exert the highest e¤ort, namely, m(x) = s 2 f1; 2; :::; ng :
We begin with the analysis of the two-player all-pay auction with discrete strategies. It should be noted that such an analysis is not necessarily similar to that of the all-pay auction with continuous strategies (Hart 2016 ). The following example illustrates a mixed strategy equilibrium in an all-pay auction with asymmetric e¤ort constrained players.
Example 1 Consider a two-player all-pay auction where players have the same value of winning v = 8; player 1's e¤ort constraint is d 1 = 5, and player 2's e¤ort constraint is d 2 = 4: Let the smallest money unit be = 1: Then, it can be veri…ed that there is an equilibrium where player 1's strategy is:
That is, player 1 chooses every x 1 2 f1; 3g with probability p x 1 = 1 4 , and x 1 = 5 with
: Player 2's equilibrium strategy is:
That is, player 2 chooses x 2 = 0 with probability p x 2 = 1 2 ; and every x 2 2 f2; 4g with
. Then, player 2 has an expected payo¤ of zero and player 1 has an expected payo¤ of 3.
Similarly to the above example, it can be veri…ed that in an all-pay auction with two players and asymmetric e¤ort constraints
; there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Moreover, in this model the equilibrium strategies are generally not unique. Nevertheless, below we characterize common properties that provide a uniform framework for all the equilibria. The …rst result demonstrates that, when approaches zero, there are no mass points on the internal points of the support of the players'mixed strategies. and the probability that player1 chooses the e¤ort 0
Thus, for all 0 < x 2 < d 2 and 0 < x 1 < d 1 we have
Proof. See Appendix.
In Proposition 1 we showed that the probability of every e¤ort (except the lowest and the highest possible e¤orts) to be chosen in equilibrium converges to zero when the smallest money unit approaches zero. Note that this result does not indicate that each of the player's e¤orts is uniformly distributed over the support of the players' mixed strategies.
However, the following result shows that the distance between two adjacent strategies x i ; y i that are chosen with positive probability by player i is not larger than twice the smallest money unit . Proof. See Appendix.
In the following, we demonstrate that in any equilibrium point when the smallest money unit converges to zero, independent of the players'values of winning, the expected payo¤ 
Below we show that imposing asymmetric e¤ort caps (constraints) may improve the players'expected total e¤ort with respect to the same contest with and without any symmetric e¤ort cap. only, the players'expected total e¤ort satis…es
By Proposition 4, we can see that the upper limit of the players'expected total e¤ort is 3v 2 2 which occurs when
converges to zero. Moreover, independent of the players'values of winning, when an e¤ort cap of d = v 2 2 is imposed on the player with the higher value of winning (player 1), the players'expected total e¤ort is larger than or equal to v 2 which is the players'highest expected total e¤ort when a symmetric e¤ort cap is imposed on both players. Interestingly, Szech (2012) showed that the designer can achieve such a high expected total e¤ort also in the standard all-pay auction with a symmetric e¤ort cap by imposing an asymmetric tie-breaking rule that favors the weaker player. Similarly to Proposition 4, Hart (2016) showed that the designer can achieve such a high expected total e¤ort also in the standard all-pay auction with continuous strategies and without an asymmetric tie-breaking rule.
Asymmetric multi-player contests
We now consider the case of the all-pay auction with more than two e¤ort-constrained players.
While the generalization of the standard two-player all-pay auction without e¤ort constraints to the case with more than two players is quite simple (see Baye Kovenock and de Vries 1996) the generalization of our all-pay auction model with asymmetric budget constraints is rather complex. In order to shed some light on this issue, we consider three players with the values of winning v 1 v 2 v 3 who have di¤erent budget constraints d 1 ; d 2 ; d 3 respectively. As such, we have six possible cases, for three of which the equilibrium strategies are immediately derived from the two-player model as follows:
In this case, we have the equilibrium where players 1 and 2 participate in the contest and player 3 stays out. The expected payo¤ of player 1 is positive while the expected payo¤ of player 2 is zero.
In this case, we have the equilibrium where players 1 and 2 participate in the contest and player 3 stays out. The expected payo¤ of player 2 is positive while the expected payo¤ of player 1 is zero.
In this case, we have the equilibrium where players 1 and 3 participate in the contest and player 2 stays out. The expected payo¤ of player 3 is positive while the expected payo¤ of player 1 is zero.
For the other three cases: Let the smallest money unit be = 1: Then, it can be veri…ed that there is an equilibrium where player 1 has the strategy: . Player 2 has the strategy: ; and x 2 = 4 with probability p x 2 = 2 7
.
Player 3 has the strategy: That is, player 3 chooses x 3 = 1 with probability p x 3 = 7 25
; x 3 = 4 with probability p x 3 = 11 25
and x 3 = 5 with probability p x 3 = 7 25
. In that case, player 3's expected payo¤ is 2 and the other players have an expected payo¤ of zero. 
Weakly asymmetric multi-player contests
Interestingly, the most complex case in multi-player all-pay auctions with asymmetric e¤ort constraints is when the players are weakly asymmetric such that there are more than one player with the highest e¤ort constraint. In such a case it is hard to provide general properties of the equilibrium strategies in the all-pay auction with asymmetric e¤ort-constrained players. One of the reasons is that the properties of the equilibrium strategies of the twoplayer all-pay auction do not hold for the equilibrium strategies of the all-pay auction with more than two players. In the next example, we show that Proposition 2 does not hold when there are more than two players, and in particular, there are adjacent strategies which are not chosen in equilibrium by any of the players. That is, player j; j = 2; 3 chooses x j = 1 with probability p x j = 1 4
and x j = 5 with probability
. In that case, all the players have an expected payo¤ of zero and none of them chooses the e¤orts x 2 f2; 3; 4g:
The following example shows that di¤erent players have positive expected payo¤s at di¤erent equilibrium points, namely, given an all-pay auction, player i may be the only player with a positive expected payo¤ in an equilibrium, and player j may be the only player with a positive expected payo¤ in a di¤erent one. Moreover, it also demonstrates that in contrast to Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 a player without the highest e¤ort constraint may have a positive expected payo¤. That is, player 1 chooses x 1 = 1 with probability 1: Player j; j = 2; 3 has the following strategy:
That is, player j; j = 2; 3 chooses x j = 0 with probability p x j = 1 3 and x j = 4 with probability
. Then, player 1's expected payo¤ is 10: 1, and each of the other players' expected payo¤ is zero. On the other hand, we have another equilibrium where player 1 has the following strategy:
That is, player 1 chooses each x 1 2 f0; 1; 3g with probability p
. Player 2 has the strategy: That is, player 2 chooses each x 2 2 f1; 3g with probability p x 2 = 2 100
; and x 2 = 4 with probability p x 2 = 96 100
: Player 3 has the strategy:
That is, player 3 chooses x 3 = 0 with probability 1: Then, player 2's expected payo¤ is 2 while the other players'expected payo¤s are zero.
Concluding remarks
The main goal of this paper was to show that the analysis of the two-player all-pay auction with asymmetric e¤ort-constrained players is di¤erent than the analysis of the all-pay auction with more than two asymmetric e¤ort-constrained players. We showed that in an all-pay auction with three asymmetric e¤ort-constrained players all the players may be active when each of them has an asymmetric strategy. In that case, the results might be unexpected especially with respect to the same model with only two players. The main distinction between the models with two players and with a larger number of players is that while in the two-player all-pay auction, independent of the players'values of winning, the player with the highest e¤ort constraint is necessarily the player with the only positive expected payo¤, in the all-pay auction with more than two players this is not the case. In other words, in the all-pay auction with more than two e¤ort-constrained players, a player's expected payo¤ depends on the players'values of winning and their e¤ort constraints. Thus, in allpay auctions with multiple asymmetric e¤ort-constrained players, the players'strategies and their expected payo¤s might be unpredictable.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that the probability that player 2 assigns for every possible positive e¤ort 0 < x 2 < d 2 is smaller than or equal to ; we obtain that player 1 strictly prefers the e¤ort y + over the e¤ort y since
we also obtain that player 1 strictly prefers the e¤ort y over the e¤ort y since
We obtained that player 1 prefers the e¤ort y + over the e¤ort y; and the e¤ort y over the e¤ort y : Thus, player 1 strictly prefers the e¤ort y + over the e¤orts y and y ;
and therefore he does not choose the strategies y and y . However, this contradicts our assumption that q y > 0. The reason is that if player 1 does not choose y and y ; player 2 has no incentive to choose the e¤ort y since if he chooses the e¤ort y he has the same probability to win and his cost is lower. Hence, we obtain that the probability that player 2 assigns to every e¤ort 0 < x 2 < d 2 is necessarily smaller than or equal to
. A similar proof holds for player 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that player 2 assigns a positive probability to the e¤ort y, i.e., q y > 0; and that he does not choose the e¤ort y + , i.e., q y+ = 0: We will now show that in that case player 2 necessarily assigns a positive probability to the e¤ort y + 2 , i.e., q y+2 > 0. Assume that q y+2 = 0, and also that the smallest e¤ort that is larger than y which is chosen with a positive probability by player 2 is x < d 2 : By our assumption, x y 3 : But then we have a contradiction, since player 1 strictly prefers the e¤ort y + over the e¤ort x. To see that,
remember that by Proposition 1 we have q x 2 v 1
; which implies that
Hence, we obtain that our assumption q y+2 = 0 is unfeasible. A similar proof holds for player 1. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 3
We …rst show that the expected payo¤ of player 2 satis…es lim 2!0 R 2 ( ) = 0: De…ne x 1 min = minfx 1 : p x 1 > 0g and similarly x 2 min = minfx 2 : p x 2 > 0g, namely, x i min is the smallest e¤ort for which player i assigns a positive probability. If x 1 min < x 2 min player 1 has no positive expected payo¤. But this is a contradiction, since if player 1 exerts a e¤ort of
Thus, let us instead assume that x 1 min = x 2 min . Then, if player 1 chooses x 1 min his expected payo¤ is
where p x 2 min is the probability that player 2 assigns to the e¤ort x 2 min : Given that player 1 chooses x 1 min with a positive probability, he weakly prefers x 1 min over x 1 min + such that
Therefore, if player 1 chooses x 1 min his expected payo¤ is positive only if x 1 min = 0; and then it is equal to or smaller than : By the same argument, if player 2 chooses x 2 min = 0 his expected payo¤ is equal to or smaller than : Furthermore, if v 1 d 2 > 2 then by exerting an e¤ort of x 1 = d 2 + player 1 has an expected payo¤ that is higher than ; and we obtain that the equality x 1 min = x 2 min is not possible. In such a case, we have that x 1 min > x 2 min which implies that the expected payo¤ of player 2 is necessarily zero. In sum, we showed that player 2's expected payo¤ is smaller than or equal to .
We now show that the expected payo¤ of player 1 satis…es
On the other hand, the highest e¤ort of player 1 is larger than or equal to
; since otherwise the expected payo¤ of player 2 is larger than . However, this contradicts the fact that R 2 : Thus, player 1's expected payo¤ is lower than or equal to
We obtain therefore that the expected payo¤ of player 1 converges to v 1 d 2 when converges to zero. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 4
The players'equilibrium strategies are as follows: Player 1's strategy is
:::
That is, player 1 chooses every e¤ort x 1 2 f0; 2 ; 4 ; :::; d 1 g with the same probability
: Player 2's strategy is 
That is, player 2 chooses every e¤ort x 2 2 f ; 3 ; :::; v 2 2 g with the same probability Hence, we obtain that the players'expected total e¤ort is The equality lim !0 T B( ) = v 2 is obtained when v 1 = v 2 ; otherwise, if v 1 > v 2 ; the expected total e¤ort is strictly larger than v 2 : Q.E.D.
Q:E:D:
Proof of Theorem 1
We will show that the minimal e¤ort of player 1 is larger than the minimal e¤orts of all the other players and therefore the other players'expected payo¤s have to be equal to zero.
Denote x 1 min = minfx 1 : p x 1 > 0g and similarly x j min = minfx j : p x j > 0g namely, x j min is the smallest e¤ort for which player j assigns a positive probability. If there is j 6 = 1 such that x j min > x 1 min ; the expected payo¤ of player 1 is zero which contradicts the fact that by exerting an e¤ort of x 1 = max j6 =1 d j + , player 1, who has the highest e¤ort constraint, can be guaranteed a positive expected payo¤, v 1 max j6 =1 d j , that is higher than or equal to : Thus, we assume now that there is j 6 = 1 such that x j min = x 1 min : In that case denote by e p x 1 min the probability of player 1 to win when he chooses the e¤ort x 1 min : Then, if player 1 chooses x 1 min his expected payo¤ is v 1 e p x 1 min x 1 min
Given that player 1 chooses x 1 min with a positive probability, he weakly prefers x 1 min over where e p x 1 min + is the probability of player 1 to win when he chooses the e¤ort x 1 min + : Since x j min = x 1 min and there is at least another player k for which x k min x 1 min , we obtain that e p x 1 min + 2e p x 1 min . Thus, we have
The last inequality contradicts the fact that player 1 can be guaranteed an expected payo¤ of at least by choosing the e¤ort x 1 = max j6 =1 d j + : Thus, we obtain that x i min < x 1 min for every i 6 = 1: Q:E:D:
